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国家资本主义家家不同: 从克林姆林宫到中东到巴西 主流与变体
原作者：The Economist
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在中国，企业老总可以调往本是竞争对手的另一家企业，这都惯例。
A choice of models
Theme and variations
State capitalism is not all the same
从克林姆林宫到中东到巴西
&&&&&&&&&&&&& 主流与变体
&&&&国家资本主义家家不同
Jan 21st 2012 | from the print edition
2012年1月21日 来源：《经济学人》纸质版
注：译文观点仅代表原文观点，不代表译者观点，如有误译敬请指正。
IT IS EASY for a casual visitor to China to be fooled into thinking that he is in a normal capitalist country. The big cities are dotted with Starbucks and Kinkos. The newspapers run stories about small businesspeople falling prey to loan sharks. Business executives are whisked around in Mercedes cars with blackened windows. Their wives and mistresses idle their afternoons away in doga classes—yoga that includes the pet dog.
But the form of capitalism on display is highly idiosyncratic. Company bosses are routinely moved to rival companies without any explanation. Company headquarters have space set aside for representatives of the armed forces. And the deeper you look, the queerer things become. In his indispensable book, “The Party”, Richard McGregor points out that the bosses of China’s 50-odd leading companies all have a “red machine” sitting next to their Bloomberg terminals and family photographs that provides an instant (and encrypted) link to the Communist Party’s high command.
What might be called “the party state” exercises a degree of control over the economy that is unparalleled in the rest of the state-capitalist world. The party has cells in most big companies—in the private as well as the state-owned sector—complete with their own offices and files on employees. It controls the appointment of captains of industry and, in the SOEs, even corporate dogsbodies. It holds meetings that shadow formal board meetings and often trump their decisions, particularly on staff appointments. It often gets involved in business planning and works with management to control workers’ pay.
The party state exercises power through two institutions: the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) and the Communist Party’s Organisation Department. SASAC, which holds shares in the biggest companies, is the world’s largest controlling shareholder and the state-capitalist institution par excellence. It has been spearheading the policy of creating national champions by consolidating and pruning its portfolio: the number of companies under its supervision has declined from 198 in 2003 to 121 today. It has also been implementing the party’s policy of creating a “harmonious society” by regulating pay. In 2009 the average SOE boss earned $88,000 and the highest-paid, the chairman of China Mobile, $182,000. High pay in SOEs has been a big source of disharmony.
SASAC can be something of a paper tiger. It has been trying for years to force the SOEs to pay higher dividends to the government, with only limited success. Similarly, nobody believes that the SOE bosses’ nominal pay bears any relation to their real remuneration. However, nobody would apply the term “paper tiger” to the Organisation Department. Created by Chairman Mao in 1924, it has become the world’s mightiest human-resources department. It appoints all the senior figures in China Inc. In 2004 it reshuffled the heads of the three biggest telecoms companies. In 2009 it rotated the bosses of the three biggest airlines. In 2010 it did the same to the chiefs of the three biggest oil companies, each of which is a Fortune 500 company. Even the most successful top executives of China’s SOEs are cadres first and company men second. They care more about pleasing their party bosses than about the global market.
The party state has reinforced its power by creating “vertical” business groups. In most emerging markets (including Hong Kong next door) business groups are “horizontal”: companies sprawl into adjacent businesses—telecoms companies into hotels, shipping companies into property—in order to exploit their local connections. In China business groups focus on particular industries. The party state encourages companies to band together into industry clusters by giving them preferential access to contracts and stockmarket listings. It also encourages them to establish subdivisions such as a domestic holding company, a finance company, a research institute and a foreign division. SASAC typically owns 100% of the shares in the holding company. The holding company in turn owns a smaller proportion of shares—say 60%—in the foreign division. This makes it possible for business groups to present lots of different faces—for instance, an inward-looking one in the form of the holding company and an outward-looking one in the form of the international division. It also allows the party state to exercise control of an entire chain of companies. Thus PetroChina might look like a regular Western company, with a listing on the New York Stock Exchange. But in fact it is the international division of a huge group called China National Petroleum Corporation, the foreign head of a dragon whose body and raison d’être lie in Beijing.
The Kremlin as capitalist-in-chief
克林姆林宫—资本主义的老大哥
In Russiathe past decade has seen a remarkable strengthening of the power of the state, which during Boris Yeltsin’s period of “wild privatisation” looked as if it might crumble. The Kremlin has turned scattered companies into national champions. Aeroflot reabsorbed regional airlines spun off in the 1990s. Russian Technologies rolled up hundreds of state companies, many of which had little to do with technology, into a vast conglomerate. The government has also renationalised industries that were privatised in the 1990s. Rosneft, an oil company, took over most of Yukos from Mikhail Khodorkovsky, once Russia’s richest man, and Gazprom bought Sibneft from Roman Abramovich.
过去的十年，俄罗斯的国家权力得到了显著加强，但在鲍里斯·叶利钦“疯狂私有化”的时代，国家权力似乎消失无踪了。克林姆林宫方面已经把分散的企业转化为企业和国家利益共赢的机构。俄罗斯国际航空企业重新整合了那些在90年代分化出的地方航空企业。俄罗斯工业技术企业整合了几百家国企，成为一家巨型集团企业，而其中许多企业几乎跟科技搭不上边。同时政府对90年代私有化了的某些行业转成了国有。俄罗斯石油企业从曾是俄罗斯首富的米哈伊尔·霍多尔科夫斯基手中接管了尤科斯石油企业的大部分，而俄罗斯天然气企业从罗曼·阿布拉莫维奇手中收购了西伯利亚石油企业。
As a result the Russian state once again controls the commanding heights of the economy—only this time through share ownership rather than directly. The state holds huge chunks of the shares of the country’s biggest and most strategic companies, including Transneft, Sukhoi, an aircraft- R S Unified Energy Systems,
A and Gazprom.
因此，俄罗斯政府重新掌控了经济的制高点—只是这一次是通过股权制的形式，而不是直接控制。对于国内的大型企业和有战略性的企业，俄罗斯政府都占有其绝大多数的股份，这些企业包括俄罗斯国家石油管道运输企业、飞机制造企业苏霍伊设计局股份有限企业、俄罗斯联邦储蓄银行、电业巨头俄罗斯统一电力企业、俄罗斯国际航空企业和俄罗斯天然气企业。
The Kremlin has also established control over Russia’s oligarchs, reducing once-mighty rottweilers to shivering chihuahuas and transforming supposedly private companies into organs of the state. The brutal persecution and imprisonment of Mr Khodorkovsky helped to instil obedience, and periodically the state waves a bloody stick at the oligarchs to keep them in their place. They dutifully pick up the tab for public works (such as the 2014 Winter Olympics) and keep out of politics.
克林姆林宫同时建立了对国内寡头政治集团的控制，把曾经如罗威纳犬庞大的势力削弱为如奇瓦瓦小狗一样不成气候的力量，并把所谓的私营企业转化为国有机关。米哈伊尔·霍多尔科夫斯基遭受迫害沦为阶下囚的事件杀一儆百，而且时不时政府就会严厉整治寡头，禁止他们越界。所以他们现在贴上了公共事业的标签（例如为2014年冬季奥运会做贡献），不涉及政治事务。
The private-sector oligarchs have been replaced at the heart of the economy by state-sector bureaugarchs, most of them former KGB officials who have close ties with Vladimir Putin and have spent the past decade steadily accumulating power (though not personal stakes in the businesses). Mr Putin, currently the prime minister, is chairman of the supervisory board of Vnesheconombank, a state development bank. Igor Sechin, the deputy prime minister, was chairman of Rosneft until Dmitry Medvedev, Russia’s president, ordered government ministers to step down as chairmen of state companies’ boards of directors last year to tidy things up. Such people form the board of Russia Inc, a company that is headed by Mr Putin, dominated by the KGB and dedicated to controlling the country’s most lucrative assets, from oil and gas to nuclear power, diamonds, metals, arms, aviation and transport.
私营寡头政治集团的经济中心地位已经被国营官僚寡头集团所代替，后者的大部分成员都是KGB前官员，与弗拉基米尔·普京关系密切，在过去的十年里稳步储蓄力量（尽管没有在企业里赚取私人股份）。现任总理普京是俄罗斯国有开发银行的监督理事会理事长。副总理伊戈尔·谢琴则是总统德米特里·梅德韦杰夫继任之前俄罗斯石油企业的董事长，去年他下令各部长往下调任各国企的监督理事会，好让一切看起来合情合理。这群人还组成了俄罗斯这个大企业的董事会，董事长是普京，由KGB控权，旨在控制全国最有利润的资源，从石油天然气到核能、钻石、金属、武器、飞机制造和交通领域。
These varieties of state capitalism all have one thing in common: politicians have far more power than they do under liberal capitalism
这些国家资本主义的变体有着一个共同点：国家资本主义下的政客有着比自由资本主义下的政客大得多的权力。
The result is a highly unusual form of capitalism, dominated by a handful of gigantic firms and controlled by a clique of security officials. Two state-controlled companies, Sberbank and Gazprom, account for more than half of the turnover of the Russian stock exchange. Russian capitalism would have been concentrated even if the Kremlin had not been so ruthless. Oil and gas companies, which account for 20% of the country’s GDP and 60% of its exports, thrive on economies of scale and scope. Poor infrastructure encourages
for example, metal companies have been buying ports to ensure that they can get their goods out on time. Still, having so much political power in so few hands has enormously increased this concentration.
这样就产生了一个非同寻常的资本主义形式，它由一些巨型企业主导、被拥护该形式的一派政府官员所控制。俄罗斯联邦储蓄银行和俄罗斯天然气企业两家国有企业在俄罗斯证券交易所的证券交易额占到了一半以上。但是即使克林姆林宫方面不采取残酷手段，俄罗斯资本主义仍会走向集中化。俄罗斯的石油和天然气企业占全国GDP的20%，出口额的60%，在这样的经济规模和范围下效益非凡。而基础设施的贫乏促进了纵向合并；例如，金属企业通过购买港口的方式来确保他们能够按时收货。另外，政治权力掌握在极少数人手上也极大推动了经济的集中化。
This quintessentially Russian form of state capitalism has nevertheless been embracing the global market. Oil and gas companies have been buying similar firms abroad or listing on foreign stock exchanges. In July 2006 Rosneft raised $11 billion by selling 15% of its shares on the London stock exchange. Russia’s sovereign-wealth funds have been particularly keen on buying foreign companies, in part because Russia’s own business practices are so murky. And Russian businesspeople have bought lots of property abroad, particularly in London.
然而俄罗斯这种典型的国家资本主义却一直盯紧了全球市场。俄罗斯的石油和天然气企业一直从国外收购同行业企业或在国外证券交易所上市。2006年7月俄罗斯石油企业在伦敦证券交易所卖掉其15%的股份，融资110亿美元。俄罗斯的主权财富基金一直以来都喜欢收购国外企业，这其中一部分原因是俄罗斯国内企业运作很混沌。另外俄罗斯商人在国外也购入了许多地产，尤其在伦敦。
Petrostate capitalism
石油王国的资本主义
Oil and water may not mix, but oil and royalty mix very well to create petrostate capitalism. Middle Eastern monarchs have been using oil to keep themselves in funds for decades. But these days some of them are taking a remarkably sophisticated approach to managing their economies, embracing professional management.
石油与水或不相溶，但石油和贵族却相互交融，形成了石油王国的资本主义。中东国家的统治者利用石油，数十年来都掌控着各种基金。然而如今他们之中正有人采取一种非常成熟的手段去管理他们国家的经济，崇尚专业化的管理。
The al-Maktoums, who rule Dubai, created Dubai World, a huge state-owned holding company, to run their projects. The Saudis have handed the day-to-day management of their biggest companies, Saudi Aramco and Saudi Basic Industries, to professional managers. The petro-royals have also become enthusiastic practitioners of state-sponsored modernisation. The al-Maktoums have been trendsetters because they never had much oil to begin with. It now accounts for under 5% of the emirate’s GDP. They have provided Dubai with a world-class airport, an important financial hub and a scattering of “knowledge villages” and “silicon centres”. Even conservative Saudi Arabia claims to be building four tech-enabled cities.
统治迪拜的阿卢·马克图姆家族创造了巨型国有控股企业迪拜世界，并以此运作他们的项目。这个沙特家族已经将他们最大的两个企业—沙特阿美企业和沙特基础工业企业—的日常管理交给了职业经理人。这些石油贵族们已经成为国家资助的现代化的积极践行者。阿卢·马克图姆家族已成为创新先锋，因为他们从来都没有太多的石油去做这个事情。现在该家族创造的价值相当于酋长国GDP的近5%。他们给迪拜提供世界一流的飞机场、一个重要的金融中心和几个分散开的“知识村”及“硅中心”。甚至走保守线路的沙特阿拉伯都称它正在建立4座科技之城。
But the Gulf model of modernisation from above has been plagued by two familiar curses, cronyism and bubbles. There is only so much that professional managers can do to prevent the local royals from damaging the region’s companies. Bahrain’s Gulf Air and Kuwait Airways have been albatrosses. Dubai World accumulated $80 billion in debt building the world’s tallest skyscraper and a palm-shaped artificial island. The state of Dubai had to be rescued by neighbouring Abu Dhabi.
但上述海湾国家的现代化模式被两个常见的魔咒所羁绊，那就是唯亲主义和投机行为。为了让当地的企业免于当地贵族的羁绊，职业经理人尚可进一步努力。巴林海湾航空和科威特航空公司已成为沉重的负担。因建造世界上第一摩天大楼和扇形人工岛，迪拜世界的负债额已达800亿美元。迪拜必须向相邻的阿布扎比求援。
The problems of cronyism and corruption have proved even more toxic in other parts of the Middle East. In Egypt Hosni Mubarak, the president until the Arab spring, handed the management of the state companies to incompetent people while making sure his cronies did well out of privatisation. In Algeria SOEs are notorious dens of patronage and typically run at only 50% of capacity. In Syria the overwhelming majority of the country’s top 250 SOEs have been in the red for many years.
中东的其他地区受唯亲主义和腐败的毒害更为严重。穆巴拉克在阿拉伯春节之前是埃及的总统，执政期间把国企的管理交给不称职的人，却让自己的亲朋好友在私有化的过程中牟利。在阿尔及利亚，国企臭名昭著，是等着援助的无底洞，常常只投入了50%运作能力。在叙利亚的250家国企中，绝大多数已亏损多年。
Leviathan as a minority investor
大海怪模式—广泛撒网 小额持股
Brazil is the most ambiguous member of the state-capitalist camp: a democracy that also embraces many of the features of Anglo-Saxon capitalism. But it is worth examining for two reasons. First, it is a weather vane for state capitalism, a leading privatiser in the 1990s that is now forcing its biggest mining company, Vale, to keep workers it does not need, and obliging a bunch of smaller companies to embark on subsidised consolidation. And second, it has invented one of the sharpest new tools in the state-capitalist toolbox.
巴西是国家资本主义阵营中最有野心的一个：这里的民主制度有着英国一带资本主义的许多特点。但它仍值得我们仔细研究的原因有2个。首先，它是国家资本主义的风向标，是20世纪90年代的私有化浪潮的先锋。如今它要求其国内最大的矿业企业Vale把冗余的员工留在企业，并强制小型企业在享受津贴的情况下合并。第二，它开发出了国家资本主义调控手段之中其中一个最厉害的工具。
Brazil has spent most of its modern history in pursuit of state-driven modernisation. A survey in the early 1980s showed that it had more than 500 SOEs. Brazil launched a privatisation drive in the 1990s to deal with hyperinflation, surging deficits and general sclerosis. But more recently it has moved in a new direction. The government has poured resources into a handful of state champions, particularly in natural resources and telecoms. It has also produced a new model of industrial policy: replacing direct with indirect government ownership through the Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES) and its investment subsidiary (BNDESPar); and swapping majority for minority ownership by acquiring shares in a broad spectrum of different companies. Sergio Lazzarini, of Brazil’s Insper Institute of Education and Research, and Aldo Musacchio, of Harvard Business School, have christened this model “Leviathan as a minority shareholder”.
巴西在其现代化进程中，把大部分的时间都用于追求国家主导的现代化。20世纪80年代初期的一项调查显示，当时巴西有500家国企。90年代，巴西掀起了私有化浪潮，以应对过度通货膨胀、高涨的赤字和经济系统的不良运转。但近来它有了新的动向。政府在企业和国家共赢的项目里投入了资源，尤其在自然资源和电信方面。另外它创造了一项行业政策的新模式：通过巴西国家发展银行(BNDES)及其投资分行(BNDESPar)以非直接的政府所有形式来替代直接的政府所有形式。此外，改变在企业内大额持股的形式，而在一大批不同的企业中持有小额股份。巴西Insper教育研究所的Sergio Lazzarini和哈佛商学院的Aldo Musacchio把这种模式称作“广撒网却小额持股的大海怪”。
This minority-shareholder model has several advantages. It limits the state’s ability to use SOEs to reward clients or to pursue social policies. Private shareholders have just enough power to kick up a fuss. But it also gives the state more influence for its money. By 2009 BNDESPar’s holdings were worth $53 billion, or just 4% of the stockmarket. Yet the state spoke with a loud voice across corporate Brazil. Messrs Lazzarini and Musacchio have also shown, in a detailed study of 296 firms traded on the S?o Paulo stock exchange between 1995 and 2003, that this model can increase firms’ returns on their assets. Brazilian companies typically underinvest in productivity-boosting equipment because the capital markets are so underdeveloped. State holdings provide them with money that they cannot get elsewhere.
这种广撒网小额持股的模式有几个优点。它限制了国家利用国企去回报相应的持股人或追求社会政策的能力。个人持股方也因此有了足够的底气去争取自身权利。但同时，该模式也增加国家股本的影响力。截至2009年，巴西国家发展银行投资分行的持股价值为530亿美元，正好占股票市场份额的4%。国家在巴西企业中的影响力还是很大的。Messrs Lazzarini 和 Musacchio针对1995年到2003年在S?o Paulo的证券交易所挂牌的296家企业做了详细的研究发现，该模式能够增加企业的投资效益。因资本市场未得到充分开发，巴西企业通常对能促进生产力的设备投资偏少，而国家持有股份可以为他们带来别的地方得不到的利润。
Yet this clever version of state capitalism is currently in danger of overreaching itself. Petrobras’s discovery, in November 2007, of huge deposits of oil buried deep beneath the Atlantic seabed has filled politicians’ heads with dreams of grand projects. The shift in the world’s balance of power from America to China has also helped to persuade many Brazilians that the future lies with state capitalism. The result has been a burst of unwise interventionism. The government is trying to force Petrobras to use expensive local equipment suppliers despite doubts about their competence. It removed Roger Agnelli from his post as CEO of Vale despite his outstanding record. It has also taken to creating national champions through forced mergers: BRF (Sadia and Perdig?o) Oi (which was made to buy Brasil Telecom) Fibria (VCP and Arucruz) in pulp and paper. Even the most sophisticated models of state capitalism are not safe from over-zealous politicians.
然而，这种灵活的国家资本主义形式现在面临着扩张过头的危险。2007年11月，巴西石油公司在大西洋海床的深部发现了巨大的石油储存量，这使得巴西政客的脑海里塞满了对大工程的憧憬。而今世界权力的平衡杆从美国向中国倾斜，使得许多巴西人相信国家资本主义才是有未来的。由此，不明智的国家干预主义来势汹汹。政府正迫使巴西石油公司与出价昂贵的当地设备供应商合作，尽管后者的资质受到了怀疑。Roger Agnelli原是巴西淡水河谷公司的总裁，表现出色，却还是被政府撤下。另外，政府开始通过强制性合并来形成企业和国家共赢的局面：食品行业的巴西食品公司（BRF）（由Sadia 和 Perdig?o合并）；电信行业的Oi（该企业为了收购巴西电信而成立）；纸浆和造纸行业的Fibria（由VCP和Arucruz合并）。即使最成熟的国家资本主义模式在头脑发热的政客面前仍然不是万无一失的。
The new elite
精英新势力
These varieties of state capitalism all have one thing in common: politicians have far more power than they do under liberal capitalism. In authoritarian regimes they can restructure entire industries at the stroke of a pen. Even in democratic ones like Brazil they can tell the biggest companies what to do. In China party hacks can find themselves running the country’s biggest companies (and SOE bosses sometimes get big jobs in the party). In Russia they may be running the biggest companies while also sitting in the cabinet. But there are nevertheless limits to Leviathan’s power.
这些国家资本主义的变体存在一个共同点：比起自由资本主义，国家资本主义的政客的权力更大。在独裁主义下，掌权的笔一挥，就能把所有行业重新洗牌。即便在巴西这样的民主国家，那些龙头企业仍然唯政府是从。在中国，执政党的高官运转着国内各大龙头企业（而有的国企的老总在党内也位高权重）。在俄罗斯，政府官员或在运转各大龙头企业的同时，在内阁仍占一席之地。但这种大海怪般的权力仍然会受到限制。
State-owned enterprises often have a good deal of operational freedom. Edward Steinfeld, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology who spent many years serving on the board of China National Offshore Oil Corporation, recalls that the company’s relationship with its political bosses had “less to do with rigid top-down control than with mixed signals, ambiguity and even outright silence”.
国企有十分大的运作自由度。Edward Steinfeld是麻省理工学院的教授，他已在中国国家近海石油企业担任董事多年，据他回忆，该企业与政府高管并不是那么严格的从属和领导的关系，而是呈现出多形态、模糊的甚至完全的互不干涉的关系。
Such enterprises can also wield a lot of influence over their supposed political masters. China’s SOEs have successfully frustrated attempts to make them pay more dividends. State-owned energy companies arguably have more influence over energy policy in state-capitalist countries than private energy companies have in liberal countries. Over a drink Russians will happily speculate about whether the Kremlin runs Gazprom or Gazprom runs the Kremlin.
这些国企同样能够对其所谓的政治上司施加强有力的影响。中国国企已经成功挫败了政府让其出让更多红利的意图。可以说，国有能源企业在国家资本主义的国家比在自由资本主义的国家，其对国家能源政策有更大的影响力。究竟是克林姆林宫控制俄罗斯天然气企业还是颠倒过来才是事实，几杯酒下肚，俄罗斯人对此津津乐道。
State-owned enterprises are also producing a more sophisticated generation of managers: people who have learned about business in the world’s best business schools, who have worked abroad and have a far less blinkered view of the world than their predecessors. Katherine Xin, of China Europe International Business School (CEIBS) in Shanghai, says that many SOEs want their managers to have a world-class business education. Baosteel has been sending its senior managers on executive MBA courses for more than a decade. It also brings in academics from Switzerland’s IMD business school to provide tailor-made courses. CNPC has been sending high-flyers to get MBAs in America since 1999. Ms Xin points out that the Chinese version of the Harvard Business Review is a must-read in the upper echelons of state-owned companies.
国企正在创造更为复杂的一代经理人：他们在世界顶级商学院学习商业课程，在国外工作，比他们的前辈们拥有更广阔的国际视野。上海中欧国际工商学院(CEIBS)的忻榕（Katherin Xin）表示，许多国企都希望其经理人拥有世界一流商学院的教育背景。宝钢集团有限企业在过去十多年都把它的高级经理人们送去学习行政工商管理硕士课程。另外它还引进了瑞士洛桑国际管理发展学院的学者，打造量身定制的课程。中国石油天然气集团企业自1999年开始就把旗下精英送去美国攻读工商管理硕士。忻榕女士指出，中文版《哈佛商业评论》是国企高管们的必读书目。
Members of this new generation of managers are changing the management of the public sector, too, as they alternate between the corporate domain and government. There are currently 17 prominent Chinese political leaders who have held senior positions in large SOEs. Conversely, 27 prominent business leaders are serving on the party’s Central Committee. If state capitalism allows politicians to shape companies, it also allows companies to shape politicians.
新一代的经理人同时也在改变国有经济的管理，因为他们需要在企业和政府体制间转换。目前，有17名中国政府高官在大型国企担任高级职务，而27名商界高管在中共中央委员会任职。在国家资本主义中，政客可以引导企业，企业也可以引导政客。
彭博终端：彭博终端是一套让金融专业人士访问“彭博专业服务”（Bloomberg Professional Service）的计算机系统。用户通过“彭博专业服务”可以查阅和分析实时的金融市场数据以及进行金融交易。（来源：和讯百科）
KGB：克格勃一直是对外情报工作、反间谍工作、国内安全工作和边境保卫等工作的主要负责部门，是一个凌驾于各部门之上的“超级部”，是一个超然的机构，它只对负责。（来源：百度百科）
相关译文来自无觅插件
一个敞亮的天窗，空气真好啊！
red machine误译，这肯定是“红派壹号”！呵呵，其实不是，因为那个时候红派壹号应该还没发明出来，你可以参考东西这篇译文相关段落，这个解释靠谱的。http://dongxi.net/b01yq
另外，开头两段没显示出来，请重新排版。
俄罗斯总理，迪拜和阿布扎比都在阿拉伯联合酋长国，何来邻国之说？
red machine误译，这肯定是“红派壹号”！呵呵，其实不是，因为那个时候红派壹号应该还没发明出来，你可以参考东西这篇译文相关段落，这个解释靠谱...
您给我的那个链接，它对应的英文原文貌似已河蟹，而我的译文开头那两段还有其他的一些字被逸尘哥与时俱进地盖起来了，呵呵~~
俄罗斯总理，迪拜和阿布扎比都在阿拉伯联合酋长国，何来邻国之说？
谢谢指正！已更正了~thx~
一个敞亮的天窗，空气真好啊！
red machine误译，这肯定是“红派壹号”！呵呵，其实不是，因为那个时候红派壹号应该还没发明出来，你可以参考东西这篇译文相关段落，这个解释靠谱...
的确应该是类似于“红派壹号”的东西，此物12年1月推出，所以应该是类似于此物的东西。想求http://dongxi.net/b01yq这个链接的英文原文哦，您是不是订阅了这个英文网站，我看不到原文。。。可以发给我原文么？
red machine误译，这肯定是“红派壹号”！呵呵，其实不是，因为那个时候红派壹号应该还没发明出来，你可以参考东西这篇译文相关段落，这个解释靠谱...
那篇有原文链接，red machine，一样的东西。东西跟译言差不多的。/wp-dyn/content/article//AR4.html
red machine误译，这肯定是“红派壹号”！呵呵，其实不是，因为那个时候红派壹号应该还没发明出来，你可以参考东西这篇译文相关段落，这个解释靠谱...
我的360浏览器打不开你给的这个链接了，嗯，我已经把注释改了，非常感谢指正！：）
华丽丽的“请见原文”
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